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THE GENDER GAP: REVEALING INEQUITIES IN ADMISSION
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
Janet C. Hoeffel*
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of the admission of Battered Woman Syndrome and
Rape Trauma Syndrome evidence reveals more than the favorable
disposition of courts towards women as victims of violence. I It reveals
a more basic bias in the application of the rules of evidence in a criminal
case. Whereas the evidentiary pendulum is in theory weighted to swing
in favor of the accused's right to present witnesses, it is in practice
weighted toward the interests of the participant perceived by society as
having more political clout. In marked ignorance or disregard of the
dictates of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
courts routinely reach out to deny the average criminal defendant-
typically male and African-American-the right to present the same
quality of evidence admitted on behalf of the victimized woman.
Neither Battered Woman Syndrome nor Rape Trauma Syndrome
evidence can meet the requirements for admission under the rules of
evidence as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 However, because the Court
"emphasize[d]" that the test it set out was a "flexible one,"' lower courts
have clung to that phrase and swung right past Daubert altogether, with
barely a bow or a nod to its substance. Courts have embraced both
syndromes as a matter of good social policy, rather than a matter of
good social science.
Courts and commentators ignore the inequalities that acceptance of
these two syndromes has made plain. Permitting prosecutors to proffer
Rape Trauma Syndrome against criminal defendants when it does not
meet the strictures of Daubert actually lowers the prosecution's burden
* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. J.D., 1990, Stanford Law
School. I wish to thank my colleagues Wendy Brown-Scott and Alan Childress for their
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article, and Stephen Singer and Julia
Bollini for their excellent editing skills and advice. I am also grateful to Erica Beecher-
Monas and Patti Stanley for giving me the opportunity to write and present this paper.
1. While it is true that for centuries courts were not favorably disposed toward
issues concerning women, this article focuses on the very recent phenomenon-since
the 1970s--of the courts' increasing recognition of and sensitization to issues
confronting female victims of violence.
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). For a discussion of the Daubert test, see infra notes 43-50
and accompanying text.
3. Id. at 594.
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of proof. Admitting into evidence either syndrome, whether it is Rape
Trauma Syndrome by prosecutors or Battered Woman Syndrome by
women defendants, while denying similar, or even more reliable, social
science expertise on behalf of the typical criminal defendant, violates
basic principles of fairness inherent in the neutral application of
evidence rules, as well as the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. This
article calls for a genuine evaluation of the admission of Battered
Woman Syndrome and Rape Trauma Syndrome in light of the require-
ments of Daubert and urges that all reasonable doubts about the
reliability of social science evidence in criminal cases be resolved in
favor of the accused-not the cause, person, or matter which society
deems politically preferable.
Part II of this article explores the admissibility of Battered Woman
Syndrome and Rape Trauma Syndrome under Daubert and discusses
why and how these two syndromes continue to find admission in
criminal cases. Part III criticizes the feminist literature urging that
evidence law move beyond the strictures of the two syndromes and
allow a broader form of "social context evidence," arguing that such
evidence, if proffered by the prosecution in a criminal case, is a form of
inadmissible character evidence which impermissibly undermines the
presumption of innocence. Part IV discusses the bias in the courts'
admissibility decisions, illustrating how social science evidence which
is very similar to the two syndromes is rejected when offered on behalf
of the average criminal defendant. Finally, Part V proposes that a return
to the proper balance in resolving evidentiary tensions means: (1) a
substantive, and not nominal, application of Daubert to evidence offered
by the prosecution; and (2) a principled and thorough evaluation of the
defendant's constitutional right to present a defense.
II. THE ADMISSION OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AND RAPE
TRAUMA SYNDROME: TRUE STORIES
A. Gatekeeping Battered Woman Syndrome
The story of the origin of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) is oft-
told. A lone researcher struck while the iron was hot, and, despite
flawed methodology, the mostly unsubstantiated theory went from a
flimsy toehold to nationwide acceptance in the courts to codification in
some states' rules of evidence. In 1979 Lenore Walker authored the
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book, The Battered Woman,4 followed five years later by The Battered
Woman Syndrome.5 She proffered in pencil a theory that has become an
indelible signature.
The syndrome is an attempt to categorize and explain the behaviors
of a "battered woman," defined as one who has repeatedly been
physically, sexually, or seriously psychologically abused by a partner in
an intimate relationship.6 In order to qualify for BWS, a particular cycle
has to have occurred at least two times.7 That cycle has three phases.
The first is a "tension building phase,"8 followed by "the acute battering
incident,"9 and then the "loving contrition phase."'" Combined with the
cycle theory is the theory of "learned helplessness," describing a
woman's behavioral state after repeated random acts of violence, which
cause her to believe there is nothing she can do to avoid the violence
and no escape without further harm. I
The publication of Dr. Walker's first book was in lock-step with the
Women's Movement in the United States. By the time she published her
first book, the movement had made tremendous strides in exposing the
problem of domestic violence, and the problem of battered women was
an issue that gripped society. After a few false starts, 3 BWS entered
courtrooms across the United States with a wink to the inadequacy of
the underlying methodology and research. 4 The admission of BWS
4. LENOREE. WALKER, THEBATTEREDWOMAN (1979).
5. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984).
6. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYNG LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How
SociETY RESPONDs 35, 102 (1989).
7. Id.
8. In this phase, which has no set duration, abuse occurs only in relatively minor
forms such as pinching, slapping, and controlled verbal or psychological abuse. Id. at
42.
9. It is relatively short in duration. The abuse during this phase is severe, violent,
and may be life-threatening. Id. at 43-44.
10. Here, the batterer apologizes, tries to make amends and promises to do better.
Id. at 44-45.
11. Id. at 50-51.
12. SUSAN SCHECTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF
THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 1-2, 32-33, 53-58 (1982).
13. See State v. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d 137 (Ohio 1981) (BWS inadmissible); Buhrle
v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Wyo. 1981) (same).
14. By 1986, Lenore Walker had testified as an expert in sixty-five cases in which
battered women had killed or hurt their abusers. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28 (1991) (citing
Lenore Walker, A Response to Elizabeth M. Schneider's Describing and Changing, 9
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 223, 224 (1986)).
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ultimately changed the landscape of self-defense law for women who
struck back at their batterers."
The first case to break the ice on admissibility was Ibn-Tamas v.
United States,6 where the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
recognized that BWS could be helpful to the finder of fact. 7 The
defendant in Ibn-Tamas was a battered woman who shot her abusive
husband and claimed self-defense.'" For admissibility of expert
testimony, the court employed the test of Dyas v. United States,'9 a part
of which was that the subject matter "must be so distinctively related to
some science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the
ken of the average layman."20 Unlike the courts before it, the District of
Columbia court held that BWS was indeed "beyond the ken of the
average layman,"' and that BWS would have enhanced the defendant's
general credibility during cross-examination about the relationship with
her husband and would have supported her testimony that her husband's
actions on the day of the shooting led her to believe she was in
imminent danger.' However, the court did not reach the scientific
reliability of the theory. The court remanded the case to the trial court
to decide whether BWS met a further criteria for admission: whether it
was "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs."'
Just two years later the supreme courts of Georgia and Maine
accepted BWS into the courtroom with absolutely no analysis of its
15. See Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not
to Junk?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 29 (1998) ("[T]he ground swell of support for
battered women has led courts and legislatures, implicitly or explicitly, to subjectify
self-defense law in this type of case. In other words, substantive law has been changed
in response to political pressures, and thus the syndrome no longer pushes the doctrinal
envelope.") (citations omitted).
16. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
17. Id. at 635.
18. Id. at 628.
19. 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C. 1977).
20. Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 632 (quoting MCCoRMIcK ON EvIDENCE § 13 (Edward
W. Clearly ed., 2d ed. 1972)).
21. Id. at 635.
22. Id. at 634.
23. Id. at 637 (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1910)).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert in 1993, most courts employed the
Frye test for admissibility of novel scientific evidence, while a minority used a more
general relevance test based upon Federal Rule of Evidence 702. On remand, the trial
court found that the defense had not shown that the methodology was generally
accepted, a discretionary determination affirmed by the court of appeals. Ibn-Tamas v.
United States, 455 A.2d 893, 894 (D.C. 1983).
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scientific reliability. 4 The only issues that were raised before each court,
and overcome, were whether the evidence would be helpful to the finder
of fact, usurp the jury's function, or improperly embrace the ultimate
issue in the case. 5 Both courts relied on Ibn-Tamas 6 and set the trend
toward admissibility.
In 1984, the New Jersey Supreme Court directly addressed the
scientific reliability of BWS in the influential case, State v. Kelly.27 The
court interpreted New Jersey's evidence rule to require that the
"technique or mode of analysis used by the expert must have a sufficient
scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results so as
to contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth."28 The court
used three criteria to determine the general acceptance of BWS:
(1) by expert testimony as to the general acceptance, among those in
the profession, of the premises on which the proffered expert witness
based his or her analysis; (2) by authoritative scientific and legal
writings indicating that the scientific community accepts the premises
underlying the proffered testimony; and (3) by judicial opinions that
indicate the expert's premises have gained general acceptance."
The court found that the first prong was met through the testimony
of the expert herself, who testified that BWS was "acknowledged and
accepted" by practitioners and professors in psychology and
psychiatry. 3 The expert also testified that the syndrome had been
discussed at several symposia.3' As to the second prong, the court noted
that there were five books and around seventy-five articles on the topic,
but did not analyze the nature of the literature, whether critical, salutary,
or merely descriptive.32 Finally, the court noted that decisions on BWS
had been split.33 With that analysis, the court held that BWS had "a
sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable
results."'
24. Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me.
1981).
25. 277 S.E.2d at 683; 438 A.2d at 894.
26. 277 S.E.2d at 682-83; 438 A.2d at 894.
27. 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
28. Id. at 380 (citations omitted).
29. Id. (citation omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 380.
34. Id.
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That leap of faith, from self-serving expert testimony and the mere
fact of publication to a conclusion of scientific validity, is unfortunately
the norm in judicial analyses of BWS, as well as analyses of most other
fields of social science research.3" The court made no attempt on its own
to understand the methodology or the underlying bases for the conclu-
sions.36 The courts to follow added no more to the analysis, but simply
bowed to the testimony of the experts before them." By 1992, thirty-two
states had allowed the use of BWS.38 In addition, numerous states have
codified the admissibility of BWS in the courtroom.39 A few courts have
even found that an attorney's failure to hire an expert in the field or
explore a battered woman's defense met the almost impossible standards
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.4' The courts have never
35. Professor Slobogin remarks that "few psychological theories or constructs
proffered in criminal cases meet [Daubert]." Christopher Slobogin, The Admissibility of
Behavioral Science Information in Criminal Trials from Primitivism to Daubert to Voice, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 100, 105 (1999). He recites error rates well above fifty
percent for diagnoses such as antisocial personality and schizoid personality, and not
much better for schizophrenia and organic disorder. Id. at 105-06.
36. That was one of the major criticisms of the Frye test. See, e.g., Paul Giannelli,
The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later,
80 COLuM. L. REv. 1197, 1218-31 (1980) (critiquing courts' application of Frye by
simply bowing to other courts' decisions). The acceptance of BWS is a mini-course on
what was wrong with the "general acceptance" standard: it became a talismanic phrase
invoked whenever all of the other courts had decided BWS was generally admissible
or when one testifying expert said it was. It had little to do with actual reliability.
37. See, e.g., People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1985):
Upon careful reflection and analysis.... it is the opinion of this court that
the theory underlying [BWS] has indeed passed beyond the experimental
stage and gained a substantial enough scientific acceptance to warrant
admissibility. According to Dr. Blackman, numerous articles and books have
been published about the battered woman's syndrome; and recent findings
of researchers in the field have confirmed its presence and thereby indicated
that the scientific community accepts its underlying premises.
Id. at 363; see also State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 972 (Ohio 1990) (noting that "[slince
1981, several books and articles have been written on this subject. In jurisdictions
which have been confronted with this issue, most have allowed expert testimony on the
battered woman syndrome"); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 315-16 (Wash. 1984)
(discussing expert testimony that BWS is a "recognized phenomenon in the psychiatric
profession and is defined as a technical term of art in professional diagnostic
textbooks," thereby joining Ibn-Tamas).
38. See Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582, 589 (D.C. 1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 1098 (2000).
39. At least eleven states have such statutes. See Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes
and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461, 484 n.77 (1996)
(citing state statutes).
40. See David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the
Age of Science, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 67, 101 & n.235 (1997) (discussing People v. Day, 2
Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), overruled on other grounds by People v.
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looked back, and to date no court has earnestly evaluated the scientific
validity of BWS. To the extent a party has attempted to show the
methodology flawed, the response of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals in Nixon v. United States4' is typical. The court did not re-
analyze the underlying foundation of BWS, but relied on the fact that
the majority of jurisdictions have found that BWS is admissible.4"
In determining the reliability of BWS in the courtroom, all federal
and most state courts today would have to apply the Supreme Court's
decision in Daubert, which interprets Federal Rule of Evidence 702."3
The court decided Daubert against a backdrop of the older standard of
admissibility articulated in Frye v. United States," which considered
whether the technique or method had "gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs."'45 Rather than leaving the determi-
nation of admissibility to a random, ever-changing group of scientists,
the Supreme Court, deciding that the Federal Rules of Evidence
overruled Frye,46 shifted the determination to the courts and charged
them to act as the gatekeepers of reliable scientific evidence.47 Courts
were instructed to engage in a "preliminary assessment of whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid and whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue."' 8 In making this determination, the Court
made a few "general observations" about four factors the courts could
consider: whether the theory or technique can be (and has been) tested;
Humphrey, 921 P.2d I (Cal. 1996); Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa.
1989)).
41. 728 A.2d 582 (D.C. 1999).
42. Id. at 589.
43. At the time Daubert was decided, Rule 702 read: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702 (2000). The Rule was recently revised to add three
further criteria for admissibility in response to Daubert: "(1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts
of the case." FED. R. EVID. 702. Given the broad language of the new rule, it is unlikely
to effect any changes in the courts' handling of expert evidence under Daubert.
44. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1910).
45. Id. at 1014.
46. Because the Federal Rules ofEvidence were promulgated after Frye, and those
rules and the Advisory Committee Notes made no allusion to Frye, the Court decided
that Rule 702 had not incorporated Frye. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S.
579, 588-89 (1993).
47. Id. at 597.
48. Id. at 592-93.
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whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication; whether the known or potential rate of error can be
determined; and whether the technique has been generally accepted
within the relevant scientific community.49 In the next breath, the Court
emphasized that the inquiry as to scientific reliability is "a flexible
one."
5 0
The four factors of Daubert are easily applied to a social science
theory such as BWS.5" As to the first factor (whether the theory can be
and has been tested), one of the first principles of the social science
method is "falsifiability," in which a researcher develops a hypothesis
and then tests for the "null hypothesis."5 The null hypothesis is the
opposite conclusion-in the case of BWS, that there is no identifiable
syndrome which is unique to battered women." Testing that hypothesis
would involve studying those who are not battered women-perhaps
those who have suffered other kinds of trauma or none whatsoever-to
compare against the observed traits of battered women. This was not
done at the time BWS was accepted into the courtroom. 4 Rather,
Leonore Walker interviewed approximately 120 women who self-
reported battery. 55 Contrary to set procedures for conducting research,
49. Id. at 593-94.
50. Id. at 594. More recently, in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Court declared
that Daubert applied to all expert testimony covered by Rule 702-not just "scientific"
knowledge, but also "technical" and "specialized" knowledge. 526 U.S. 137, 147-49
(1999). Kumho thus put to rest any confusion over whether Daubert applied to the "soft
sciences" such as social science.
51. A substantive application of Daubert involves applying the suggested factors
where, and if, applicable-it does not mean randomly picking and choosing when it is
convenient or desirable to apply those factors. Kumho Tire's decision to apply Daubert
to fields other than those that are "scientific" suggests this proposition, and the Kumho
Court agreed that the four factors should be employed where they are "pertinent in
assessing reliability depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular
expertise, and the subject ofhis testimony." 526 U.S. at 150. The factors are "pertinent"
to social science research, which follows the scientific method ofcreating and rejecting
hypotheses through testing, setting up controls and quality standards, and reducing the
possibility of examiner bias and error.
52. See generally JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 45-91 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing social science methods).
53. The dictionary defines a "syndrome" as "a group of signs and symptoms that
occur together and characterize a particular abnormality." MERRIAM-WEBsTER
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (I 0th ed. 1998).
54. See Faigman & Wright, supra note 40, at 106 ("[R]esearchers of battered
woman syndrome have not come close to a serious scientific examination of their
hypotheses"; "failure to subject syndrome research to falsification attempts is perhaps
the greatest weakness of the battered woman syndrome theory.")
55. WALKER, supra note 4, at xiii. Walker herself admits: "These women were not
randomly selected, and they cannot be considered a legitimate data base from which
[Vol. 24
THE GENDER GAP IN EVIDENCE
Walker never questioned or tested key assumptions: (1) these women
were battered; and (2) the characteristics observed were unique to
battered women.56 Further, Professor David Faigman and Amy Wright
have observed that Walker's own studies do not show what they purport
to show." For example, while Walker claims a three-phase cycle, only
about thirty-eight percent of the women studied actually experienced all
three phases.58
On the second Daubert factor, peer review and publication, BWS
likewise fails to impress. The fact that interest in the topic has generated
articles and books does not adequately address this factor. The question
to be answered is whether peers in the relevant fields have reviewed and
commented on the methods and conclusions of the study or publication,
and whether those peers validated or panned it. In the case of BWS,
Walker's seminal books, and much of the commentary to follow, were
printed in the popular press, not a peer-reviewed journal.59 Therefore,
Walker's work was not meaningfully critiqued.
Third, to determine rate of error, the questions for courtroom
purposes are the extent to which the syndrome accurately describes a
woman who has been beaten, in order to use those attributes to help her
make a claim of self-defense; and the extent to which the syndrome
accurately pinpoints beating as the cause of the woman's behavior,
when whether she was beaten is an issue. Neither can be accurately
determined as long as the existence of the syndrome is in question. If the
syndrome does not exist, there is no predictive value, and the error rate
will be intolerably high. If it is argued that a syndrome of sorts exists,
research could compare victims of other trauma or no trauma with
victims of domestic violence to determine overlap and uniqueness.
Those studies have not been conducted, as thus far research concerning
BWS has been the sole province of those who are backers of the
syndrome and who have little incentive to conduct confirmatory studies.
Finally, courts found that BWS was generally accepted by listening
to the expert witness before them tell them so; by defining the field
narrowly to those who study battered women, as opposed to social
scientists or psychologists generally; and by finding that other courts
to make specific generalizations." Id.
56. Id.
57. See Faigman & Wright, supra note 40, at 77.
58. Id. at 77-78.
59. See id. at 108 (observing that the "outlet of choice" for the principal research
projects upon which the theory is based has been the public press).
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found the syndrome generally accepted.' To the extent that "general
acceptance" is a proxy for reliability, the courts have not adequately and
independently determined that BWS is generally accepted in the
relevant scientific community.
Given the lack of demonstrated reliability, why have courts not
seriously reevaluated BWS in light of Daubert and Kumho? Professor
Robert Mosteller plausibly suggests politics:
The motivation for admitting BWS is quite understandable. Domestic
violence by husbands and boyfriends against women is an enormous
social problem in the United States .... In a situation where precise
proof of actual events and the survivor's state of mind will be
difficult, the judgment is that women who kill and can show a history
of battering should be aided in their legal defense; when marginal
cases are tried, the women should generally be given some help in
prevailing. In this context, even though the precise elements of BWS
are uncertain and some aspects of the syndrome's scientific founda-
tion remain weak or unprovenjudges and legislators believe BWS to
be better than the existing ignorance ofjurors.6'
The argument for admissibility on political grounds is an appealing
one.62 Additionally, allowing BWS in on behalf of the criminal
defendant, despite lack of indicia of reliability, also has a legitimate
legal basis-it comports with the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to present a defense.63
The rub, however, is two-fold. First, BWS is not always used
defensively. It is sometimes proffered by the prosecution when the
defendant is charged with causing physical injury or death to the victim,
ostensibly to show that the victim acted consistently with a battered
woman, but undeniably having the effect of showing the defendant to
60. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
61. Mosteller, supra note 39, at 486-87. Professor Taslitz endorses this theme and
argues that these political results should be embraced and not apologized for. Andrew
E. Taslitz, A FeministApproach to Social Science Evidence: Foundations, 5 MICH. J. GENDER
& L. 1, 71-72 (1998). See also Slobogin, supra note 35, at 118 (predicting an uproar if
courts were to disallow BWS at this point: "To avoid such damage to the political
viability of the system, one might conscientiously endorse continued admission of this
syndrome testimony, despite its suspect nature[.J").
62. Professor Faigman is unhappy with compromising the integrity of the rules of
evidence for political purposes. He states: "The law's gullibility in regard to syndrome
evidence is profound; it displays the wishful desire to come to the correct political
outcome, rather than any statement about the situation battered women confront."
David L. Faigman, The Syndromic Lawyer Syndrome: A Psychological Theory ofEvidentiary
Munificence, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 817, 821 (1996).
63. See infra notes 186-227 and accompanying text.
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have acted consistently with a batterer." BWS is also used by the
prosecution to counteract the testimony of the battered woman when she
is the defendant, to show she acted inconsistently with BWS.6' As will
be discussed, such prosecutorial use of the syndrome violates eviden-
tiary rules and constitutional principles. Second, as will also be
discussed, defensive use of BWS, while a laudable victory for women,
has no spillover effect into the rights of the typical criminal defendant
proffering similar kinds of social science evidence.
B. Gatekeeping Rape Trauma Syndrome
Like the evolution of the Battered Woman Syndrome, one study
virtually propelled Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS) to the forefront of the
social science agenda and into the courtroom. Ann Burgess, a professor
of nursing, and Lynda Holmstrom, a professor of sociology, coined the
phrase" and ascribed to it a two-stage process: an "acute phase,"
consisting of impact, somatic, and emotional reactions, followed by a
long-term "reorganization" phase, consisting of increased motor
activity, rape-related phobias, nightmares, and difficulties maintaining
close relationships." The study was limited in scope, the result of an
interview of 146 persons reporting their rapes at the emergency room of
Boston City Hospital;" and, while calling it a "syndrome"--indicating
some identifiable collection of symptoms-the research itself nonethe-
less revealed that there was not much of a pattern to the reactions of the
self-reporting victims. 69 For example, the acute stress reaction could
either be expressed-as fear, anger, or anxiety-or it could be passive
and controlled, showing an outwardly calm and quiet victim. 0 Similarly,
in the reorganization phase, some victims outwardly exhibited psycho-
logical or social problems, where others outwardly appeared
unaffected."' This would seem to leave the only commonality among the
victims their self-expressed report of rape. As with Walker's BWS
64. See David L. Faigman, Lookingfor Policy in All the Wrong Places: A Comment on
the Strategies of "The Race and Gender Crowd" Toward Evidence Law, 28 Sw. U. L. REV.
289, 294 n.13 (1999) (citing cases).
65. See id. at 294 n.14 (citing cases).
66. Ann W. Burgess & Lynda L. Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 981 (1974).
67. Id. at 982-984.
68. Id. at 981. Of the 146 victims reporting, 109 were adult women, 34 were
female children, and 3 were male children. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 982.
71. Id. at 983, 985.
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study, the methodological problems with this study included lack of a
control group, a small and potentially homogenous sample size, and
self-selection by those willing to be interviewed."
Later studies did little more to substantiate the existence of an
identifiable syndrome. The studies found that victims' reactions to rape
vary from individual to individual with no predictable pattern,"3 that
victims of rape experience no set of symptoms that set them apart from
victims of other traumatic events, and that there is little distinction
between the reactions of a victim of rape and the reactions of the victim
of any other sort of stressful sexual event.7 4 While the Fourth Edition of
the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) identifies rape as one of the potential
stressors which causes post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)," such a
categorization does not render RTS any more reliable as an indicator
that rape is the cause of the observed symptoms. The fact that a person
is suffering from PTSD suggests a traumatic event of some kind at some
point, but does not illuminate the cause or the timing.
Rape Trauma Syndrome emerged in the courtrooms in the early
1980s, on the heels of the Women's Movement and the acceptance of
BWS, and, while meeting with mixed success at first, has passed muster
with every court considering the evidence since 1989. The quality of the
science did not increase, only the courts' willingness to embrace the
theory.
72. See Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., The Aftermath of Rape: Recent Empirical Findings,
49 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 658, 658-59 (1979) (describing flawed methodology of
rape research to date).
73. "Each rape victim responds to and integrates the experience differently
depending on her age, life situation, the circumstances of the rape, her specific
personality style, and the responses of those from whom she seeks support." Malkah
T. Notman & Carol C. Nadelson, The Rape Victim: Psychodynamic Considerations, 133
Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 408, 409 (1976); see also SEDELLE KATZ & MARY ANN MAZUR,
UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VIcnM: A SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS, 215-31 (1979)
(describing wide variety of responses of rape victims).
74. See Burgess & Holstrom, supra note 66, at 981-82 (noting that a sexually
stressful event could include where the victim consented to certain sexual acts initially
but the situation went beyond the victim's expectations); Robert R. Lawrence, Note,
Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of Expert Testimony of
Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings, 70 VA. L. REv. 1657, 1673-80 (1984)
(summarizing the studies on RTS).
75. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 424 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. PTSD is described as
"the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme
traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual
or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to one's physical integrity." Id.
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The only courts which seriously addressed the reliability and
validity of RTS found it inadmissible, and the conclusions of those
courts remain valid today. For example, in State v. Saldana,76 the
Supreme Court of Minnesota excluded evidence of the syndrome
because RTS "is not the type of scientific test that accurately and
reliably determines whether a rape has occurred."" The court wrote: "At
best, the syndrome describes only symptoms that occur with some
frequency, but makes no pretense of describing every single case."" s In
a more in-depth analysis of the issue, the California Supreme Court in
People v. Bledsoe79 agreed that RTS was inadmissible to prove that a rape
had occurred, recognizing that the syndrome was developed as a
treatment tool and not devised to determine the truth of the allegations.
The court recognized that "as a rule, rape counselors do not probe
inconsistencies in their clients' descriptions of the facts of the incident,
nor do they conduct independent investigations to determine whether
other evidence corroborates or contradicts their clients' renditions.""0
Likewise, because the studies have emanated from the counseling
process, "none of the studies has attempted independently to verify the
'truth' of the clients' recollections or to determine the legal implication
of the clients' factual accounts."'" Finally, in State v. Black,"2 the
Washington Supreme Court also found RTS an unreliable means for
proving lack of consent in a rape case. 3 Reviewing studies on the
syndrome, the court found that no "typical" response to rape emerges,"
that similar symptoms may be triggered by any traumatic event,8 5 and
that peers have found the methodology of the studies thus far severely
lacking."
Of the courts that have allowed RTS testimony, only one has even
considered the issue of its scientific reliability. In a one-sentence
76. 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982).
77. Id. at 229.
78. Id. at 230.
79. 681 P.2d 291 (Cal. 1984).
80. Id at 300-01.
81. Id.
82. 745 P.2d 12 (Wash. 1987).
83. Id. at 19. The court used the Frye "general acceptance" test for admissibility.
Id. at 15.
84. Id. at 16.
85. Id. Traumatic events that trigger such responses can include "bereavement,
chronic illness, marital conflict, assault, military combat, natural disasters, automobile
accidents, bombing or torture." Id. (citing AMRCAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDaES 236-38 (3d ed. 1980)).
86. Id. at 17.
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analysis, the Supreme Court of Kansas answered the issue thus: "An
examination of the literature clearly demonstrates that the so-called
'rape trauma syndrome' is generally accepted to be a common reaction
to sexual assault.""7 In support, the court cited a handbook, a textbook,
two Burgess and Holstrom books, and pages out of three other books
which mention the syndrome.8 The court did not further analyze the
cited materials or the underlying methodology: there are books,
therefore the theory must be generally accepted.
The other courts which have admitted RTS have not analyzed the
reliability of the syndrome, but, to the extent the issue is even men-
tioned, they rely on the decisions of other courts accepting RTS as
evidence of its reliability. 9 The only discussion of issues regarding
admissibility involves a finding that RTS is helpful to the jury,9 that the
testimony was not confusing or misleading,9' or, that the expert
expressed no personal opinion on the credibility of the victim.' By far
the most popular reason for the introduction of RTS, even admitting its
tentative reliability, is that it is not being offered to show that a rape
occurred, but only to explain the behavior of the victim in the face of a
defense challenge of her behavior."3 However, if RTS is unreliable to
show that a rape occurred, then it is equally unreliable to show behav-
iors "consistent with" rape. The difference is purely semantic. The
inescapable consequence of such testimony is thatjurors understand that
the described behaviors are consistent with rape because people who are
raped exhibit these symptoms, collectively called "Rape Trauma
Syndrome." It would be virtually impossible for ajuror to parse out the
forbidden from the permitted inference. Agreeing that this is a distinc-
tion without a difference, the New Mexico Supreme Court, finding RTS
reliable for either purpose, stated:
87. State v. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (Kan. 1982).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., State v. Huey, 699 P.2d 1290,1294 (Ariz. 1985); State v. Kinney, 762
A.2d 833, 841 (Vt. 2000).
90. State v. Liddell, 685 P.2d 918, 923 (Mont. 1984).
91. Id.
92. State v. Ali, 660 A.2d 337, 351 (Conn. 1995); Simmons v. State, 504 N.E.2d
575, 579 (Ind. 1987); State v. Allewalt, 517 A.2d 741, 751 (Md. App. 1986).
93. See, e.g., People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947,951-53 (Colo. 1987); Ali, 660 A.2d
at 351-52; Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289, 1301 (Md. App. 1995); People v. Taylor,
552 N.E.2d 131, 138 (N.Y. 1990); see also Mosteller, supra note 39, at 464:
Psychological syndrome evidence can almost never diagnose the cause, but when group
character evidence is offered for the "limited purpose of supporting the credibility of
a witness after that credibility has been attacked, the evidence is far more likely to be
scientifically valid and sufficiently valuable to justify admission."
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Both of these purposes for which PTSD evidence is offered rest on
the valid scientific premise that victims of sexual abuse exhibit
identifiable symptoms. Either the PTSD diagnosis is a valid scientific
technique for identifying certain symptoms of sexual abuse or it is not
.. Allowing PTSD testimony to explain a complainant's apparent
inconsistent behavior after the alleged incident is no less prejudicial
than allowing an expert to testify that the complainant's symptoms
are consistent with sexual abuse. In the first instance, the jury can just
as easily infer from the explanatory testimony that the complainant
was raped because the expert is testifying that rape victims act a
certain way and the complainant acted that way."
Only one court has directly discussed whether RTS is admissible
under Daubert. In what might be called the Daubert "two-step," the
Supreme Court of Vermont invoked Daubert but then did not require the
State to present any evidence on the four factors of the test.95 Rather, it
held the trial court could find the evidence admissible "because its
reliability equals that of other technical evidence we have given trial
courts the discretion to admit and the evaluation of other courts allowing
the admission of the evidence is complete and persuasive." Using a
"flexible standard of admissibility that is fully consistent with
Daubert,"97 the court followed its earlier opinions finding PTSD (of
which RTS may be considered a subcategory) generally admissible,
with no analysis of the methodology."
Were RTS to be substantively analyzed under Daubert, it would not
pass the test. Research subsequent to Burgess's and Holmstrom's first
study has bome out that there is no identifiable and predictable set of
behaviors which describe a rape victim. While RTS may serve well its
intended purpose-therapy and treatment-it falls short of a standard of
reliability needed before jurors rely on it to help them evaluate a rape
case in a court of law.
94. State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 210 (N.M. 1993).
95. State v. Kinney, 762 A.2d 833, 842 (Vt. 2000).
96. Id
97. Id. at 841.
98. Id. at 841-42. Professor Slobogin has noted that Daubert has had "remarkably
little impact on either the extent or the content of psychological testimony in criminal
cases." Slobogin, supra note 35, at 106. He cites a massive study, which reviewed every
appellate decision dealing with the admissibility of BWS and RTS since Daubert in
1993 through 1997 and which concluded, "[c]ourts are not generally engaging in
scientific reviews of the proffered syndrome .... Most typically, the focus is on
general acceptance and the qualifications of the expert, and even then the judicial
review tends to be cursory." Id (quoting study).
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Neither BWS nor RTS pass evidentiary muster, but both have
passed through the courtroom doors to aid the cause of female victims
of violence. However, as the next section discusses, the syndromes are
met with criticism by some feminists, who see syndrome evidence as
too constricting to sufficiently aid the female victim of violence.9
Unfortunately, the feminist solution runs into evidentiary problems of
its own.
III. FEMINIST EXPANSION OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE: SOCIAL CONTEXT
EVIDENCE
Feminist legal commentators want to push the boundaries of
admissibility to evidence which will promote social change and, first
and foremost, ensure that the woman's voice is heard.' As a general
goal, that may be legitimate. However, the strategy is unfair when
expansion of one group's rights occurs at the expense of a less powerful
and more socially disadvantaged group, such as the young African-
American males who comprise the vast majority of criminal defendants.
The evidence desired by this feminist group goes beyond the boundaries
of BWS and RTS, and, unfortunately, enters territory that impinges on
the rights of criminal defendants.
For a group of feminists who have critiqued evidence rules,'0 ' BWS
and RTS are socially dangerous and practically problematic. Socially,
both syndromes portray women as victims, as less than equals in
society, and, worse, as sick or mentally ill.' 2 Practically, both syn-
99. See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 61, at 41-42. Patriarchal evidence rules permitting
use of RTS to rebut rape myths but not to prove that a rape occurred improperly bans
"bruise-like reasoning"---the claim that just as a bruise demonstrates that a punch
occurred, rape trauma syndrome demonstrates a rape. Id.
100. See Andrew W. Taslitz, What Feminism Has To Offer Evidence Law, 28 Sw. U. L.
REV. 171, 184-85 (1999) ("The challenge is to identify legal and social strategies that
will allow us to change law and culture simultaneously, by illuminating the context of
power and control within which a woman lives and acts.") (quoting Mahoney, supra
note 14, at 93-94).
101. There is a fairly recent surge of feminist analysis of evidentiary rules. Kit
Kinport's article, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413 (1991), is credited with
being the first article of this kind.
102. See, e.g., DONALD A. DOWNS, MORE THAN VICTIMS: BATTERED WOMEN, THE
SYNDROME SOCIETY, AND THE LAW 192 (1996) ("A misplaced compassion degrades both
the victims, who are reduced to objects of pity, and their would-be benefactors, who
find it easier to pity their fellow citizens than to hold them up to impersonal standards,
attainment of which would entitle them to respect.") (quoting Christopher Lasch, THE
REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY 105 (1995)); Mahoney, supra
note 14, at 25 ("Because the term 'battered woman' focuses on the woman in a violent
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dromes are susceptible to character evidence challenges when proffered
against the defendant °3 and, by their nature, risk being used against
women. For example, because each syndrome tries, unsuccessfully, to
force a profile out of disparate effects and behaviors, some women may
not fit the definition."° In response to these difficulties, feminists
propose either a broader definition of the terms of BWS and RTS0 5 or,
more radically from the point of view of evidence law, "social context
evidence. ' '" °"
Social context evidence would consist of statistics and general
background information about either the dynamics of battering or the
dynamics of rape." 7 In a rape case, for example, Professor Aviva
Orenstein suggests allowing an expert to testify to demographic,
relationship rather than the man or the battering process, it creates a tendency to see the
woman as the problem."); Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial: Subordination, SocialScience
Evidence, and Criminal Defense, 51 RUTGERs L. REv. 45, 67 (1998) ( BWS is a
"stereotype[] of irrationality, pathology, and genetic deficiency."); Myrna S. Raeder,
The Better Way: The Role of Batterers'Profiles and Expert "'Social Framework" Background
in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 147, 152 (1997)
("Shoehorning women into the BWS model, which emphasizes the victim's
helplessness, also reinforces a stereotypical portrait of females that the defense can
easily exploit."); Taslitz, supra note 100, at 183 ("Many feminists... believe that BWS
creates images of women as flawed, even deranged.").
103. For example, BWS can be used as character evidence against a male defendant
when prosecuting him for abuse and battery. By using it to show the victim was abused,
it is indirectly showing the defendant as an abuser.
104. For example, it has been contended that African-American and lesbian women
do not fit the profile. See Mahoney, supra note 14, at 30, 32-33; see also Raeder, supra
note 102, at 178-79 ("[Tlhe current formulation of BWS acts as an evidentiary
straitjacket that pigeonholes all women's experiences into one paradigm. Thus, victims
who fail to meet BWS criteria cannot avail themselves of the explanation of domestic
violence background that BWS provides."). Professor Angela Harris calls this problem
"gender essentialism": "the notion that a unitary, 'essential' women's experience can
be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation and other
realities ofexperience." Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,
42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585 (1999).
105. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 14, at 56-57 (proposing a new definition of
battered woman's syndrome as "separation assault," shifting emphasis to the batterer
and his violent attempts at control in order to "focus on his motivations rather than the
psychology of the victim").
106. In general, "[t]he various attempts by feminist scholars to define battering
show some tension between breadth-reaching to include the many ways women are
harmed-and precision in describing particular experience, which generally leads
toward focus on incidents." Id. at 30.
107. Social context evidence would allowjuries to "'construct a frame of reference
or background context for deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a specific
case."' Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape
Trials, 49 HASTINGs L.J. 663, 709 (1998) (quoting Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1987)).
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psychological, and sociological background about rape, including the
frequency of rape and the wide range of victims and perpetrators. 10 8
More specifically, in a given case, the expert could speak to pertinent
facts such as: most victims are raped by people they know, most victims
are less likely to report a rape where they are acquainted with the
perpetrator, and rapists can be "nice boys," not just desperate,
dangerous-appearing people.'" In a similar vein, in battering cases,
Professor Myrna Raeder suggests using the testimony of an expert on
battering relationships."0 For example, in a murder case where the
prosecution's theory is that a battering husband killed his abused wife,
an expert statistician might tell the jury that between one-third to two-
thirds of all women murdered are killed by their batterers."'
The admissibility problems of social context evidence cannot be
overcome. The first problem is purely a matter of relevance. Many
courts have found that showing a "profile" of the crimes of others to
prove the defendant's crime is not even relevant."' The prosecution's
theory of relevance is that, from a profile of how rapes occur and how
rapists act, a jury can find that this situation and this defendant fit that
general profile. The problem is that using evidence that the defendant
fits a profile to prove that he committed the act is inadmissible character
evidence.' 3 Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence precludes
108. Id at 711.
109. Id. at 707.
110. Raeder, supra note 102, at 181.
111. Id
112. See, e.g., People v. Bradley, 526 N.E.2d 916, 921 (I11. App. 1988) (finding that
evidence showing characteristics of child abuse perpetrators was in no way probative
or relevant to the question of whether the defendant committed the crime); State v.
Clements, 770 P.2d 447, 454 (Kan. 1989) (stating that evidence which only describes
the characteristics of the typical offender has no relevance to whether the defendant
committed the crime in question); Duley v. State, 467 A.2d 776, 780 (Md. App. 1983)
(finding evidence of child abuser profile totally irrelevant because it does not tend to
prove that the defendant committed the acts of abuse attributed to him); State v.
Hansen, 743 P.2d 157, 161 (Or. 1987) (en banc) (stating that whether child abusers use
certain techniques to get near their victims has no bearing on whether a person who
does those things is a child abuser); State v. Percy, 507 A.2d 955, 960 (Vt. 1986),
(noting evidence that other rapists often excused their conduct the way defendant did
was not relevant).
113. See, e.g., Haakanson v. State, 760 P.2d 1030, 1035-36 (Alaska 1988) (evidence
of child sex abuse profile inadmissible character evidence); People v. Walkey, 223 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (evidence of "battering parent syndrome"
inadmissible character evidence); Sanders v. State, 303 S.E.2d 13, 18 (Ga. 1983)
(same); State v. Hester, 760 P.2d 27,33 (Idaho 1988) (evidence showing characteristics
of child abuse perpetrators inadmissible character evidence); Bradley, 526 N.E.2d at 921
(same); In the Interests of D.L., 401 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (battered
parent profile inadmissible character evidence); State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 62-
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evidence of other bad acts of the defendant to prove his propensity to
commit the charged crime."4 Offering statistics of other circumstances
and other people to show that the scenario proffered by the prosecution
fits this particular defendant and this particular case is as troublesome
as the typical Rule 404(b) evidence. Allowing a prosecutor to argue to
the jury that the bad acts of others show a general pattern in which this
defendant's actions fit is similar to, and as prejudicial as, the forbidden
Rule 404(b) inference that the prior bad acts of the defendant form a
pattern which the defendant is bound to repeat. Worse, in the absence of
proof of a high level of reliability, the social context evidence poses an
unacceptably high risk that persons who are not guilty will be sent tojail
for very long periods, or even executed.
A second but related problem is that the use of statistics violates the
presumption of innocence as well as the right to individualized
judgment. It is the prosecution's burden to prove this defendant
committed this crime. Allowing the prosecution's burden to be eased by
trying to fit the defendant's case into a "rape mold" is improper. The
infamous case of People v. Collins' is illustrative. In Collins, the
prosecution offered a mathematician who testified that the probability
of any other two people, besides the defendants, fitting the description
given by the witnesses to this robbery was one in twelve million."6 The
Supreme Court of California readily zeroed in on the problem: "The
prosecution's approach ... could furnish the jury with absolutely no
guidance on the crucial issue: Of the admittedly few such couples, which
one, if any, was guilty of this robbery? Probability theory necessarily
remains silent on that question .... ." Similarly here, the fact that
others have raped under similar circumstances, or that other rape victims
have behaved similarly under similar circumstances, does not inform the
jury whether this defendant raped this victim."8
64 (Minn. 1981) (evidence of "battering parent syndrome" inadmissible character
evidence); Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 55-56 (Wyo. 1999) (holding that expert
testimony on "separation violence" phenomenon commonly found in abusive
relationships, amounting to a "profile" of batterers, was inadmissible character
evidence in prosecution of defendant for murdering his wife).
114. FED. R. EVD. 404(b).
115. 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968).
116. Id. at 37. The expert arrived at his conclusion using frequency numbers
assumed by the prosecutor. Id. at 36-37.
117. Id. at 40 (emphasis in original).
118. Probabilities may be appropriate in a criminal trial after significant scientific
research has proven the reliability of the underlying assumptions and bases for the
statistics. For example, probability statistics for DNA comparisons were put through
a great deal of testing and challenges before finally being accepted into court in their
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A third admissibility problem is that, for now, there is no indication
that the statistics meet the demands of Daubert. The courts will have to
engage in an analysis of the methods used for the collection of the
statistics, the size of the sample pool, and the accuracy of the conclu-
sions. This will be a very similar analysis to the one that the courts
engaged in before accepting probabilities in DNA."19 Even if the
statistical adequacy can be proved, however, the marginal relevance will
remain substantially outweighed by the risk the jury will use the
"profile" of the rapist community to convict this defendant.
The final admissibility problem with social context evidence is a
broader systemic problem. If defendants' rights to present evidence are
to approach equality with those of the prosecution, it would only be fair
treatment to allow a defendant to present social context evidence in his
own defense. For example, a defendant might wish to explain his actions
by having an expert testify that males who grow up in a violent or
abusive environment have difficulty controlling their behavior or
recognizing it as wrong. However, as discussed in the next section,
social context evidence on behalf of criminal defendants has little
chance of recognition by the courts. 20 As a class, African-American
male criminal defendants are perhaps the least politically powerful
group that appears before a tribunal.
Proponents of social context evidence make several arguments for
its admission, all of which short-circuit arguments about its reliability
or potential prejudice to the defendant. The first is that social context
evidence must be admitted to ensure that the female voice is heard. This
is not an argument based in tenets of law, but one of social justice.'
current form. See Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable
Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REv. 465, 488-92 (1990)
(describing then-existing debate over probability statistics).
119. See id. However, with DNA population studies, the scientist deals with fixed,
objective data, as opposed to probabilities based on rapist characteristics, which are
relatively amorphous and subjective criteria that may never satisfactorily reduce
themselves to reliable statistics.
120. See infra notes 162-85 and accompanying text (discussing Urban Survival
Syndrome and Black Rage Syndrome).
121. The proposal is that the effect of the trial on society, not the individual, is
primary. See Marguiles, supra note 102, at 96 (observing that the core of feminist
analysis is "the acknowledgment that social science in the courtroom does not merely
describe, but also constitutes, our world" and "[]udges' interpretations ... enter a
broader stock of cultural knowledge that organizes people's experience and gives
meaning to what we see") (quoting Vicki Schultz, Telling StoriesAbout Women and Work;
Judicial Interpretations ofSex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack
of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1750, 1757 (1990)) (alterations in original);
Orenstein, supra note 107, at 716 ("Belief in rape myths correlates with willingness to
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While catering to one aspect of justice-social justice-the argument
compromises another aspect-individual justice-which protects the
accused from the formidable power of the state. This is not to say that
the female voice should not be heard, but simply that it should not
drown out the voice of the less empowered, such as the young African-
American male criminal defendant. Regardless of the desirability of
hearing the female voice, it must meet the prosecution's burden of proof
and evidentiary responsibilities in a criminal case.
The second argument for admission is that the evidence should not
have to meet Daubert because the test is simply too rigid. Professor
Taslitz argues that "the Daubert test and factors--or at least a particular
reading of that test and those factors-reflect patriarchal assumptions
about the nature of knowledge": it is "a masculinist, market-based
notion of truth: the fierce competition for dominance and reward in the
free marketplace of ideas will weed out flawed conceptions of the one
true objective reality that we seek to discover."'22 This leaves a void as
to what is to replace Daubert as the standard.'23 If rules of evidence
break down into what might best be called "story-telling," then nothing
prevents the victim and her relatives from making a victim impact
statement to the jury during the trial, or lay opinions on whether the
victim acted like a woman who was raped, or, for that matter, testimony
that the victim had a reputation for sleeping around. The evidentiary
rules regarding character, reliability, and relevance, properly applied,
enable a jury to focus its best efforts on the guilt or innocence of the
defendant in the trial at hand.
In response to claims that social context evidence may be imper-
missible character evidence, 24 Professor Orenstein opines that
"[p]roviding statistics about the wide-spread nature of rape should not
encourage the jury to engage in probabilistic reasoning that it is
somehow likely that the accused committed the rape."'25 She claims that
"[t]he purpose of such evidence is not to argue for propensity, but rather
to undermine our culture's limited understanding of rape, including
rape and tolerance of rape. By educating the jury and perforce educating society at
large, we protect women.").
122. Taslitz, supra note 61, at 2-3.
123. Professor Taslitz suggests replacement with an amorphous concept of
"evidentiary richness": "The answer lies in the narrative coherence of human lives."
Id. at 61.
124. See id at 31-33 (acknowledging that the line between using profile evidence
as evidence of mental state and as probability evidence is "thin" and that jurors are
likely to improperly use the evidence despite instructions from judge).
125. Orenstein, supra note 107, at 707.
2001]
UALR LAW REVIEW
sexist and class-based notions about victims and racist and class-based
notions about attackers."'" 6 However, the "purpose" she proposes does
not address a specific element in a rape case. The only purpose for
which the jury could use such statistics would be to find that, because
rape has occurred in a similar manner on so many occasions, it is more
probably true in this case as well. Indeed, one suspects that this is the
proponent's hope, lest the evidence have no probative value.
Professor Raeder recognizes there is an argument that such
testimony "interferes with the presumption of innocence," but finds the
overall value of the evidence a more compelling argument. 2 ' In
response to the issue of inadmissible character evidence, she responds
that this evidence is less prejudicial than evidence that the victim
suffered from BWS, and that any residual character issues could be dealt
with by instruction that the jury is not to use the evidence as proof that
the woman was battered, but instead "to use the evidence as a frame-
work for evaluating other evidence presented in the trial."'2 It will be
difficult for jurors to follow or understand that instruction as, again, the
question arises what relevance is the "framework" if not to make
assumptions about the defendant?
While Professor Raeder recognizes that both the prosecution and
the defense should be able to take advantage of such an expert,
Professor Orenstein contorts her theory in order to prevent defense use
of social context evidence in a rape case. She asserts that the purpose of
the evidence is only for myth-debunking, which defendants cannot
claim, and that defendants can have no use for this background evidence
whose "message is the heterogeneity of victims and perpetrators and the
variety of rapes and motives for rape."'29 However, her own suggestions
for use of the statistics show that the message to the jury is not what the
numbers indicate about all rapes (indeed, that would be irrelevant), but
about this rape. 3' Why defendants cannot take advantage of the same
126. Id. at 714.
127. Raeder, supra note 102, at 181-82.
128. Id. at 185.
129. Orenstein, supra note 107, at 714.
130. For example, the idea that the expert will testify only about the heterogeneous
nature of rape, rather than about a specific characteristic, is betrayed by Professor
Orenstein's approval of the use of an expert in Keyv. State, 765 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1989). She explains that in Key, a rape crisis counselor "testified about how rapists
choose their victims, explaining that it was not uncommon [as in this case] for a rapist
to establish a brief relationship with the victim, such as being seen in public with the
victim before raping her so that she would not suspect any potential danger and so that
her credibility would be diminished." Orenstein, supra note 107, at 708 (citing Key, 765
S.W.2d at 849).
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sort of statistics and background evidence is a mystery.' Her illogical
sequence lays bare her political agenda.
In sum, the feminist goal of ensuring the inclusion of the woman's
"voice" to the exclusivity of other ends of justice has the effect of
perverting the criminal justice system.'32 In the criminal justice arena,
any attempt to strike an even balance between the defendant and the
victim is misguided.' The defendant and the victim are not the
opposing parties. The State and the defendant are, and, in this contest,
there is no question that the State has enormous power compared to the
typically under-equipped, under-financed, and powerless criminal
defendant. In recognition of this inherent inequity, certain constitutional
provisions-such as the burden of proof aid the Sixth Amendment
guarantees '3 -attempt in small ways to ameliorate the inequity. The
feminist refusal to weigh the interests of the defendant in the balance
does damage to the system, and it has been echoed in the courts, as the
next section discusses.
IV. THE COURTROOM BIAS AGAINST ADMISSIBILITY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
At the same time that Battered Woman Syndrome and Rape
Trauma Syndrome have found comfortable niches in criminal cases,
social scientific evidence helpful to the typical criminal defendant has
met with only limited success in the courts. As much as the political
impetus has been in favor of scientific evidence supporting claims of
women as victims, it has been resoundingly against similar scientific
evidence that could be helpful to the great mass of criminal defendants.
131. For example, a defendant in a case where the victim did not know her attacker
could offer statistics that most women are raped by men they know. Unlike Rule
404(b), no evidence rule strictly precludes the introduction of profile evidence on
behalf of the accused.
132. For example, while Professor Margulies at least acknowledges that "[tihe harm
created by these stereotypes [of women as subordinate] is more diffuse and amorphous
than the harm a criminal conviction creates for the defendant[,]" Margulies, supra note
102, at 61, much feminist literature passes right over the interests of the defendant,
who, after all, is the rapist or the batterer.
133. Professor Bandes notes that, while former Chief Justice Burger frequently
expressed that the rights of the victim must be weighed in the balance, commentators
have shown that there is a "lack of authority for the concept that the victim has such
rights, and... that such rights are used as a makeweight on the state's side of the
balance." Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's Right to a Fair
Trial, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019, 1049 (1987).
134. See infra Part V (discussing such features).
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This section will consider three such areas: eyewitness reliability
experts, false confession experts, and syndrome evidence proffered on
behalf of the urban young African-American male.
Expert testimony as to eyewitness reliability is used almost
exclusively by the criminal defendant. Of the social science expertise
floating about in the courtrooms of the United States, eyewitness
fallibility expertise is one of the most reliable forms. 35 The few courts
which have taken the time to study the scientific reliability of the
expertise have found that it meets the requirements of Daubert.'36 The
field is an example of how "soft science" can be "good science." The
study of eyewitness reliability has far outpaced the studies of battered
women and rape victims.
Nonetheless, the majority of courts reject the testimony,137 and not
for lack of scientific reliability. As in other contexts, the courts wish to
avoid the entire subject of science. Instead, the courts' rationale behind
denial of the evidence is most often that the expert is not "helpful to the
finder of fact," and therefore does not fulfill one of the requirements of
Rule 702.13' The argument is thatjurors arejust as equipped as an expert
to understand the fallibility of eyewitness testimony. However, the
average layperson does, in fact, harbor common myths that would be
rebutted by the testimony of the expert. Contrary to popular belief,
39
135. See Steven D. Penrod et al., Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness
Reliability Before and After Daubert: The State of the Law and Science, 13 BEHAv. Sci. & L.
229, 256 (1995) (concluding that the evidence meets the reliability requirements of
Daubert); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for
Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 604 (1998) ("The scientific
study of eyewitness testimony has been one of the most successful applied research
topics in scientific psychology over the last two decades.").
136. See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 71-74 (D. Mass. 1999); see
also United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 314-15 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding district
court should have held Daubert hearing before rejecting expert testimony, and,
reviewing Daubert factors, finding that the testimony may well have been found
"scientifically valid"); State v. McClendon, 730 A.2d 1107, 1125-26 (Conn. 1999)
(Berdon, J., dissenting) (finding, after exhaustive analysis, proposed expert testimony
on eyewitness reliability meets Daubert).
137. See Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair
of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1032 (1995) (concluding that most
courts reject the evidence).
138. See supra note 43 (setting forth text of Rule). For illustrative cases, see United
States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1104-06 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1029
(1999); McClendon, 730 A.2d at 1116; cf United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289
(2d Cir. 1999) (stating that expert testimony usurps jury's role to assess credibility of
witnesses).
139. Wells et al., supra note 135, at 619-20 (citing surveys which have clearly
shown "people believe that there is a strong relation between eyewitness identification
confidence and eyewitness identification accuracy"); see Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
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there is no correlation between the eyewitness's stated level of confi-
dence and the accuracy of his or her identification, 4 ' and an exceptional
event, such as a robbery, makes memory of the details worse, not
better.'4 ' Another complaint courts have expressed is that the relevance
of the evidence is not outweighed by the potential for prejudice, because
it is only "general" testimony about the characteristics of eyewitnesses
and is not directly applied by the expert to the facts of the case. 42
The courts' conclusions in this regard stand in stark contrast to their
evaluation of BWS and RTS. As to the "helpfulness" prong, here the
courts are eager to conclude that jurors may have myths about battered
women ("Why don't they leave?") or rape victims ("Why didn't she
report it right away?"),' and therefore there is no question that the
expert evidence will be helpful in debunking these myths. Similarly, the
generality of the evidence has not been considered a problem, but a
positive feature, the courts' reasoning being the less the expert com-
ments directly on the veracity of the victim, the better.'"
Why courts are so resistant to seeing the same phenomena at work
in eyewitness reliability expertise can only be surmised. 45 The most
likely explanation is political: RTS and BWS are well-contained and
specific only to women victims, a sympathetic group, while eyewitness
reliability testimony theoretically could apply to a very large number of
cases, potentially leading to acquittals of many criminal defendants.
199-200 (1972) (noting that eyewitness certainty is one of five factors that should be
considered in making judgments about the accuracy of an eyewitness identification).
140. Wells et al., supra note 135, at 621-26 (reviewing studies which demonstrate
the weak relation between witness confidence and accuracy). "Jurors appear to
overestimate the accuracy of identifications, fail to differentiate accurate from
inaccurate eyewitnesses-because they rely so heavily on witness confidence, which
is relatively nondiagnostic-and are generally insensitive to other factors that influence
identification accuracy." Id. at 624.
141. Handberg, supra note 137, at 1035 & nn. 130-31 (citing study findings showing
subjects' ignorance about the impact of stress on accuracy of identification).
142. See Slobogin, supra note 35, at 107 ("[R]esearch-based testimony about the
foibles ofeyewitnessing, among the most valid psychological testimony, has often been
excluded because its nomothetic nature does not directly address the accuracy of the
eyewitness in question and because it is found to 'usurp' the jury's role in credibility
assessment.").
143. Despite the fact that those myths may no longer be widespread, courts are
unlikely to revisit the issue, given all of the attention on crimes against women in the
media.
144. See State v. Ali, 660 A.2d 337, 351 (Conn. 1995); Simmons v. State, 504
N.E.2d 575, 579 (Ind. 1987); State v. Allewalt, 517 A.2d 741, 751 (Md. App. 1986).
145. Professor Slobogin comments, "[O]ne often gets the sense that exclusion of
evidence on lack of helpfulness or acceptance grounds is a smokescreen hiding a more
pressing concern about substantive impact." Slobogin, supra note 15, at 30.
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Whereas courts have given the benefit of the doubt on the reliability of
the evidence to women in the former, courts have given the benefit of
the doubt to the prosecution in the latter.
Another example of an area of social science expertise proffered by
criminal defendants and generally rejected by the courts is the study of
false confessions. While not as well-developed as eyewitness fallibility
research, a significant amount of study has been conducted. Dr. Gisli H.
Gudjonsson of the Institute of Psychiatry in London pioneered the false
confession theory. He compiled case studies, developed a theory of false
confessions, and wrote a book 46 that traveled across the Atlantic to spur
further research in the United States. Several other prominent research-
ers in the field have emerged to contribute to the development of a body
of literature discussing case studies of false confessions.'47 If allowed to
testify, an expert in this area tells jurors the factors that may contribute
to a person giving a false confession to a crime. 4 Like the other areas
of "group character" evidence, the evidence relies on a larger picture of
those who have falsely confessed and then either the expert or the jury
compares the factors at issue in the individual case with the overall
picture.'49
False confession theory appears to have a reliability level on par
with BWS or RTS. Each have produced a significant body of research,
146. GISLI H. GuDJoNsSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND
TESTIMONY (1992).
147. See, e.g., SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
CONFEsSION EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE (1985); Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L.
Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance, Internalization, and
Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. Sci. 125 (1996); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The
Consequences ofFalse Confessions: Deprivations ofLiberty and Miscarriages ofJustice in the
Age ofPsychologicalInterrogation, 88 J.CRIM. L.&CRIMINoLOGY 429 (1998) [hereinafter
Consequences ofFalse Confessions]; Richard L. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision To
Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and IrrationalAction, 74 DENV. U. L. REv. 979 (1997);
Richard A. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The
Theory and Classification of False Confessions, 16 STUD. L. POL. & SOC'Y 189 (1997).
148. For example, police-induced false confessions may arise when a suspect's
resistance to confession is broken down as a result of poor police practice,
overzealousness, criminal misconduct, and/or misdirected training. Consequences of
False Confessions, supra note 147, at 440; see also United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp.
1198, 1203 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (citing the vastness of the studies in the area); Welsh S.
White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy
Confessions, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 118-31 (1997) (discussing empirical
evidence showing interrogation techniques and unique susceptibilities of defendants
which can produce false confessions).
149. If allowed to testify, the expert is usually precluded from opining on whether
the confession in the particular case is false. See Hall, 974 F. Supp. at 1205; State v.
Wells, No. 93CA9, 1994 WL 497745, at *3 (Ohio App. Sept. 8, 1994).
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albeit limited to a few researchers and not always placed in a peer-
reviewed journal. Similar to the study of battered women or rape
survivors, most of the research in the area of false confessions has
involved the study of anecdotal evidence, as ethical considerations bar
experiments replicating circumstances of extracting false confessions of
a crime from innocent persons. 5 ° Therefore, also similar to BWS and
RTS, there is little evidence of the rate of error of the theory. However,
at least one commentator has argued that false confession theory is
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community as all who study
it agree that false confessions exist' and that certain factors can be
isolated as contributors.' While amassing a similar research back-
ground to BWS and RTS, however, most courts have disallowed false
confession expert testimony.'53
One striking case admitting the evidence, however, demonstrates
that the perceived innocence of a defendant may be the only loophole
winning him the right to have reliable expert testimony. In United States
v. Hall,'54 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
claimed that the lower court had misapplied Daubert in refusing to allow
the false confession testimony.'55 That error of law allowed for de novo
review rather than a review for abuse of discretion. 5 6 It is rare, if ever,
that de novo review of an admissibility decision has been invoked;
150. There has been one laboratory experiment to date. See generally Kassin &
Kiechel, supra note 147.
151. It is now demonstrably clear that false confessions can and do occur, as DNA
exonerations have shown. See generally BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD, & JIM DwYER,
ACTUAL INNOCENCE 92 (2000). Among DNA exonerations studied by the Innocence
Project at Cardozo Law School, twenty-three percent of the convictions were based on
false confessions or admissions. Id. at 92.
152. Major James R. Agar II, The Admissibility of False Confession Expert Testimony,
ARMY LAW., Aug. 1999, at 26, 39-43 (applying Daubert factors and concluding that
false confession testimony needs more research before it is admissible).
153. See, e.g., People v. Gilliam, 670 N.E.2d 606, 619 (Ill. 1996); Bixler v. State,
582 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Minn. 1998); People v. Green, 683 N.Y.S.2d 597, 600 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1998); Kolb v. Wyoming Dep't of Corr., 930 P.2d 1238, 1242 (Wyo. 1996),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 839 (2000); cf Bullard v. State, 650 So. 2d 631, 632 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1995) (upholding trial court's denial of funds for false confessions expert);
State v. MacDonald, 718 A.2d 195, 198-99 (Me. 1998) (ruling inadmissible expert
testimony as to existence of a syndrome of children of alcoholics which could lead to
a false confession); State v. Monroe, 711 A.2d 878, 889 (N.H. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1073 (1999) (upholding trial court's denial of funds for false confessions expert).
154. 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996).
155. Id. at 1342.
156. Id. The trial court had found that the expert testimony would not be helpful to
the finder of fact and did not discuss Daubert at all. Id. Of course, such an overlooking
of Daubert is unfortunately all too common.
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review of lower courts' admissibility decisions has practically become
a rubber stamp. 7 Here, it appears that the court was taking the
extraordinary step of reaching out to reverse the defendant's conviction
because there were strong indicia of actual innocence and a false
confession.'58 The court found that the trial court misunderstood the
"helpfulness" prong as requiring that the testimony be outside juror
comprehension'59 and remanded to the trial court for a Daubert hearing
on the evidence.
Taking its cue, the district court found that the field of study passed
Daubert: it was well-published and peer-reviewed and, while not tested,
was hard to test."W While not a particularly rigorous application of
Daubert, it appears that the district court made a decision that, in the
particular case, admission suited the interests of justice, much as has
been done in the cases allowing BWS and RTS. In light of the many
other cases denying this evidence to the defendant, Hall seems to
distinguish itself only on its facts. The facts rendered by the court,
baldly revealing its concern that an innocent defendant gave a false
confession, appeared to be the sole factor that led the court to find that
the expert testimony might be a reliable aid to the jury. It is highly
unlikely that this case would have had the same result if the court had
no particular thoughts about the innocence of the defendant. 6 However,
this is an unacceptable method for determining evidentiary reliability.
Evidence is either reliable or it is not. If it is reliable enough to place
157. The cases demonstrating the toothlessness of "abuse of discretion" are legion.
See, e.g., supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing State v. Kinney, 762
A.2d 833 (Vt. 2000)).
158. The court's rendition of the facts takes pains to demonstrate the shakiness of
the prosecution's case: the confession was the only evidence against Hall; Hall had
mental health problems; the police already had a confession from someone else; and
the confession was extracted after several days of questioning, including one session
that lasted eighteen hours, and was written by the FBI agent, not Hall. Hall, 93 F.3d at
1339-40.
159. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that
Rule 702 helpfulness does not mean it must be beyond the ken of the average juror).
160. Hall, 974 F. Supp. at 1203-05.
161. Indeed, this theme is played out in Hall itself. After the case was remanded, the
defendant again was convicted and appealed. This time, however, the government had
found a few eyewitnesses. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected Hall's claim that it
was an abuse of discretion to disallow an eyewitness expert, on the grounds his
testimony would not "assist the trier of fact" since it was within juror comprehension.
165 F.3d at 1106. The decision is a remarkable about-face, given its earlier decision on
false confession testimony, and explained only by the fact that now Hall did not appear
innocent to the court.
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doubts in the jurors' minds when a defendant immediately appears
innocent to the court, it is reliable enough to admit in any case.
As a final example of the courts' reluctance to embrace defense-
oriented social science evidence, courts have uniformly rejected the
attempt to admit "syndromes" that could potentially fit a large number
of defendants. One of these is Urban Psychosis, or its variation, Urban
Survival Syndrome. Its general theory is that the war-like features of
inner-city living make African-American men fear other African-
American men.1 62 More precisely, however, the theory depends upon
factors that place it squarely in the realm of recognized post-traumatic
stress disorders. 163 Urban Psychosis depends upon continued and chronic
exposure to real-life violence.'" There are numerous studies on the
effects of real-life violence on individuals, which may lead to a variety
of symptoms such as PTSD, depression and anxiety, suicide, and
violence directed toward others. 65 Some of these studies have focused
specifically on the problem of minority youth witnessing chronic
violence, whether street violence, or battery and abuse in their homes166
Urban Psychosis, therefore, has a similar theory to BWS, and could
potentially be utilized in a similar manner. For example, Urban
Psychosis could explain why a defendant believed he was facing
imminent bodily harm from another young African-American man who
had his back to him across a courtyard. Nonetheless, Urban Psychosis
barely saw the light of day. 67 The popular press, stirred by Professor
Alan Dershowitz's influential book deriding "the abuse excuse,"' 6
trumped up charges of defendants taking advantage of the system with
stories of abuse. 69 With the extreme unpopularity of theories such as
162. See Slobogin, supra note 15, at 6.
163. See DSM-IV, supra note 75, at 424 (defining PTSD).
164. See Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based Upon the Toxicity
of the Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and BlackRage, 74 N.C.
L. REV. 731,759-66 (1996) (discussing real-life violence aspect of Urban Psychosis).
165. See id. at 762 & nn.183-86 (discussing studies).
166. See id. at 762-65 & nn.187-202.
167. Professor Falk cites to four cases where Urban Psychosis or Urban Survival
Syndrome was introduced by the defense, as either evidence of insanity, PTSD, or self-
defense, with limited success. Id. at 738-41; see also Wally Owens, Casenote, State v.
Osby, The Urban Survival Defense, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 809 (1995).
168. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, Tm ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER Cop-OuTs, SOB STORIES,
AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY (1994). He defined the "abuse excuse" as "the legal
tactic by which criminal defendants claim a history of abuse as an excuse for violent
retaliation." Id. at 3.
169. See Peter Arenella, Demysting the Abuse Excuse: Is There One? 19 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 703,705 (1996) (describing the public's decrying of the "abuse excuse,"
despite the fact that actual legal practice employing such alleged "excuses" was
2001]
UALR LAW REVIEW
Urban Psychosis, it is unlikely that social scientists would pursue
serious research in the area or attempt to find a niche for the theory in
the DSM-IV.170 The true problem with Urban Psychosis is not its faulty
scientific underpinnings, as there appears to be sufficient research on the
study of the effects of violence to make its validity debatable.17' Rather,
the problem with the theory, from its inception, was the "apocalyptic
predictions of the demise of our criminal justice system because large
segments of society will be able to obviate criminal liability."'" While
that is a fear with little support,' 3 it is a fear which grips society and
courts.
The "Black Rage" theory has met with a similar fate. Black Rage
is characterized by "an uncontrollable rage precipitated by racism and
unequal treatment."' 74 While not using precisely that terminology, the
theory was employed in a number of cases, to show evidence either of
mental illness or provocation, where the defendant's act was triggered
by a specific racial incident.' 75 Again, as with Urban Psychosis, it was
only offered to the extent it met the requirements of a traditional defense
such as insanity. As with Urban Psychosis, there are studies to support
the notion that racism has profound and deleterious effects on individu-
als, from paranoia to PTSD.' 76 Nonetheless, Black Rage theory is
extraordinarily unpopular and criticized.
conventional, in that the mitigating evidence was brought in under entirely traditional
rubrics, such as self-defense and insanity, and with no threatening level of success).
170. "[O]nly a few studies are specifically geared toward assessing the impact of
living in a violent, urban environment; the greater portion of this research concerns the
effects of other forms of violence, such as familial abuse, crime victimization, and
combat." Falk, supra note 164, at 765. Unlike research into RTS and BWS, which may
affect rich white women in large enough numbers to make treatment financially
lucrative, developing treatment regimes for Urban Psychosis is unlikely to attend to a
large number of wealthy clients for private treatment.
171. Professor Falk, after reviewing the research in the area, concludes that Urban
Psychosis meets the threshold evidentiary requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence
702. Id. at 782.
172. Id. at 805; see also Slobogin, supra note 15, at 24 ("[T]he judges in these types
of cases seem to be saying, almost everyone who commits a crime has been subject to
some type of traumatizing condition; we cannot excuse them all.").
173. See Falk, supra note 164, at 805 (noting that there have been few cases
presenting the theory and that, in most cases, it will not fit the requirements for
insanity, self-defense, or diminished capacity).
174. Deborah L. Goldklang, Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Black Rage:
Clinical Validity, Criminal Responsibility, 5 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 213, 216 (1997)
(arguing that Black Rage meets the criteria for PTSD).
175. See Falk, supra note 164, at 748-57 (describing cases).
176. See id. at 775-77 & nn.238-250 (describing studies in support); Goldklang,
supra note 174, at 221-24 (reviewing the results of social science research).
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While battered women are easily viewed as victims, young African-
American men living in a world of violence are not. There is sympathy
and a receptive audience for the belief of feminists that the ills of society
must be dealt with in court by allowing social context evidence to come
to light. On the other hand, the threat of the introduction of Urban
Psychosis or Black Rage draws commentary that could just as easily be
applied to social context evidence in rape and battering cases: it is not
society that is on trial, but an individual. 7 The difference in the courts'
analysis and acceptance of social framework evidence aiding the cause
of female victims of violence and the same kind of evidence offered by
the more typical criminal defendant is no more than the desirability of
the recipient.
Those who do propose a broadening of defenses to cover external
psychological influences 78 find a way to distinguish the "unpalatable"
cases from the "palatable" to avoid helping the typical criminal
defendant. For example, Professor Peter Margulies would allow
psychological defenses that give respect to subordinated persons, but do
not denigrate them. Therefore, his argument proceeds, Rotten Social
Background7 9 and Black Rage defenses should not be admitted as
"background" evidence for a crime, on the theory that they pathologize
poor people and people of color and, in addition, the victim is likely to
be a subordinated person as well-poor, elderly, or female." On the
other hand, they should be allowed in for "interpersonal" situations
where the defendant was faced with some subordinating act, such as a
verbal or physical insult.' His theme? "Evidence law should reject
determinism, and engage with contingency, to promote justice not only
for defendants, but for all constituencies with a stake in criminal
trials."'82 In other words, a criminal trial is transformed from an
investigation of historical facts into a forum for promoting broader
177. For example, in United States v. Alexander, the leading case dealing with the
defense of "Rotten Social Background," Judge McGowan, writing for the majority
stated, "the issue before [the jury] for decision is not one ofthe shortcomings of society
generally, but rather that of [appellant's] criminal responsibility." 471 F.2d 923, 968
(D.C. Cir. 1972). In Zamora v. State, 361 So. 2d 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), where
the court rejected the defense of television insanity, the court said, "[T]elevision was
not on trial; Ronny Zamora was on trial." Id. at 784.
178. External psychological influences are to be distinguished from internal causes
of mental health problems comprising traditional psychiatric testimony.
179. Rotten Social Background is another variation on Black Rage or Urban
Psychosis. See Falk, supra note 164, at 781.
180. Margulies, supra note 102, at 121, 124 (citing Alexander, 471 F.2d at 959).
181. Id. at 126-27.
182. Id. at 140.
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social agendas. In a similar vein, Professor Andrew Taslitz argues that
the consequences of acquitting a battered woman are less than those of
acquitting Bernhard Goetz"8 3 and "[w]e should take these social costs
into account in crafting rules governing whether to permit expert
testimony in the battered woman and subway vigilante cases.""
These distinctions between desirable defenses and undesirable
defenses draw a political line that is difficult to maintain legally. All
criminal defendants should be accorded equal status under the law: all
should be presumed innocent until proven guilty and all should have an
equal opportunity to put on a defense. If Urban Survival Syndrome,
Rotten Social Background, or any other broad-sweeping syndrome that
contributed to an excusable mental state at the time of the crime is
relevant just as Battered Woman Syndrome is, 85 then the identity of the
defendant should not impact admissibility. Much as defenders of the
First Amendment must defend the white supremacist's right to march
as well as the African-American's, defenders of the Sixth Amendment
cannot pick and choose the defendants who receive its protections.
V. THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE PROSECU-
TION'S DUTY To FOLLOW THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
There are both evidentiary and constitutional implications for the
inequity between the courts' treatment of proffers of group character
evidence on behalf of criminal defendants generally and those proffered
by the prosecution. From an evidentiary point of view, Rule 702 and
Daubert make no distinction between evidence proffered by the defense
and evidence proffered by the prosecution. The rules of evidence are
portrayed as neutral on their face, applying equally to both sides of a
dispute, whether criminal or civil. Daubert is a civil case,'86 so the
183. Bernhard Goetz, a white middle-aged man, was acquitted ofcharges stemming
from his shooting and wounding of four black youth on a New York subway in 1984.
He became a controversial figure and a "folk hero" of sorts. See Stephen L. Carter,
When Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 422-23 (1988) (describing the
phenomenon).
184. Andrew E. Taslitz, Abuse Excuses and the Logic and Politics ofExpert Relevance,
49 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1064 (1998).
185. After all, relevance is a very low threshold for admissibility of evidence. See
FED. R. EVID. 401 (relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence"). Therefore, it will always be that
"[olne man's relevance is another man's waste of time." Taslitz, supra note 184, at
1057.
186. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), and General Electric Co. v.
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Supreme Court decided it in the context of a civil dispute, where the
parties in any individual case may not be equally situated but systemati-
cally there is no position of advantage. From an evidentiary point of
view, the truth-seeking function of a trial is primary. Unreliable
evidence proffered by either side means an opportunity for an erroneous
verdict in that party's favor. An erroneous verdict on behalf of either
party is equally undesirable.
However, constitutional law has recognized that the primary
function of a criminal trial may not be truth-seeking, but the accused's
right to a just and fair verdict.'87 Reducing the risk of conviction of the
innocent has been a paramount concern in constitutional criminal law.
The overwhelming power of the State, the rationale that punishment
must be perceived as just, and the desire for individualized justice led
to the need to ameliorate the inherent inequity of power between the
prosecution and the defense to assure fair and just verdicts. Hence, in In
re Winship,'88 the Supreme Court constitutionalized the accused's right
not to be convicted on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.189 In
the oft-quoted famous concurrence of Justice Harlan, the beyond a
reasonable doubt requirement is "bottomed on a fundamental value
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free. '"
In this constitutional context the impact ofevidentiary rules may be
very different on a defendant than on the State. Professor Katherine
Goldwasser explores the results of the application of the reasonable
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the other two cases in the seminal Daubert trio, are also
civil cases.
187. The Sixth Amendment's trial-related rights of the accused are designed to
ensure fair play. As Professor Bandes points out, the fair play model of justice is
exemplified by Justice Douglas's comments in Wardius v. Oregon: "The Bill of Rights
does not envision an adversary proceeding between two equal parties. .. . But, the
Constitution recognized the awesome power of indictment and the virtually limitless
resources of government investigators. Much of the Bill ofRights is designed to redress
the advantage that inheres in a government prosecution." 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973),
quotedin Bandes, supra note 133, at 1032. Bandes describes the two competing interests
of a trial as the search for truth model--equating a fair result with an accurate
result-and the fair play model--rejecting the premise that the parties must be treated
equally, and arguing that the defendant must be given the advantage. Bandes, supra
note 133, at 1037-40.
188. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
189. Id. at 364.
190. Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan was mimicking an idea that was as
old as Blackstone himself, who stated that "the law holds, that it is better that ten guilty
persons escape than that one [innocent] person suffer." 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTAIES
358 (1765).
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doubt rule and concludes, "when viewed through the lens of the
reasonable doubt rule, to exclude [relevant] defense evidence (and
thereby increase the risk of an erroneous conviction) solely out of
concern about the risk of an erroneous acquittal is flatly unaccept-
able."91
The Supreme Court has explored this dynamic between the
Constitution and the rules of evidence in its Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence." The Court has found the accused's Sixth Amendment right to
present a defense overrides "arbitrary" evidentiary rules that particularly
impact the defense." 3 In Rock v. Arkansas,"4 the Court had the opportu-
nity to explicitly address admissibility of "shaky" scientific evidence'
in light of the right to present a defense.
Vickie Rock was charged with manslaughter in the death of her
husband."S Events leading up to the shooting of her husband indicated
that she was a battered woman." 7 Apparently, Vickie and her husband
Frank were having an argument."8 Frank refused to let Vickie eat some
pizza and prevented her from leaving the apartment to get something
else to eat. 9 When she stood up to leave the room, Frank grabbed her
191. Katherine Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to Trial by Jury and the Requirement
ofProofBeyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Critique ofthe Conventional Wisdom About Excluding
Defense Evidence, 86 GEO. L.J. 621,635-36 (1998). In contrast, Professor Taslitz argues
in effect the opposite conclusion, putting no weight onto the defendant's side of the
scale. He argues that if we are to assume that RTS creates a twenty percent chance of
erroneous acquittal, that should be taken into account in favoring a rule of
admissibility, whereas the error rate for erroneous convictions is not a concern when
any error can be dealt with by traditional evidentiary weighing of probative value
versus prejudicial impact. Taslitz, supra note 61, at 76-77. Further, he claims that social
harm, and not just harm to the defendant, should play into the decision. Id at 77.
192. Relevant here is the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory
process, which, translated by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Texas, is, "in plain
terms the right to present a defense." 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
193. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,691 (1986) (holding exclusion of testimony
about the circumstances of defendant's confession deprived him of a fair trial);
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973) (finding application of
Mississippi's common law voucher rule and hearsay rule deprived defendant of a fair
trial); Washington, 388 U.S. at 23 (holding that the rule precluding accomplice
testimony violated accused's right to compulsory process).
194. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
195. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) ("Vigorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.").
196. Rock, 483 U.S. at 45.
197. See id. at 44-45.
198. Id. at 44.
199. Id.
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by the throat and choked her and threw her against the wall."°° She
picked up a gun, and when he hit her again, she shot him in the chest
and killed him.20 1 When the police arrived, she was distraught, pleading,
"don't let him die" and "please save him."
202
The issue in Rock was the trial court's denial of the introduction of
her hypnotically-refreshed memory.2 3 It was only after hypnosis that
Vickie was able to recall the circumstances of the shooting-that she
had her thumb on the hammer of the gun, but had not held her finger on
the trigger.2 4 The gun had then discharged when her husband grabbed
her arm in the scuffle.0 5 This memory was subsequently corroborated
by a gun expert's examination of the handgun, which revealed that the
gun was defective and prone to fire if hit or dropped, without the trigger
being pulled.2°
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the trial court's
ruling and found hypnotically refreshed testimony so unreliable as to
require a per se rule of inadmissibility.0 7 In reversing, the United States
Supreme Court admitted that "there is no generally accepted theory to
explain the phenomenon, or even a consensus on a single definition of
hypnosis '  and "scientific understanding of the phenomenon and of the
means to control the effect of hypnosis is still in its infancy. '"209
Nonetheless, the Court held that the per se rule of inadmissibility
arbitrarily denied Vickie Rock her Sixth Amendment right to present a
defense.2 m0 The Court described various procedures endorsed by other
courts which would reduce the potential unreliability, and concluded
that the State "has not shown that hypnotically enhanced testimony is
always so untrustworthy and so immune to the traditional means of
evaluating credibility that it should disable a defendant from presenting
her version of the events for which she is on trial.""21
200. Id. at 45.
201. Id.
202. Rock, 483 U.S. at 45-46.
203. Id at 53.
204. Id. at 47.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 48-49.
208. Rock, 483 U.S. at 59.
209. Id. at 61.
210. Id. The Court made its finding based on several sources in the Constitution,
including the due process right to be heard and offer testimony, and the compulsory
process clause, which includes the defendant's right to testify. Id. at 51-53.
211. Id. at61.
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Rock appeared to stand for a trumping of reliability-based exclu-
sions of scientific evidence in favor of the Sixth Amendment right to
present a defense. The holding of Rock is "a strong statement that
defendants should be allowed to tell their story unless it is completely
untrustworthy or so immune to the weapons of the adversarial process
that its questionable nature is not likely to be exposed." ' Although the
opinion appeared to have struck a major victory for criminal defendants
proffering scientific evidence, Rock is an island, confined to its facts,
isolated by a tide of decisions and sentiments crashing against it.
Eleven years later, the Supreme Court eroded any lasting signifi-
cance of Rock in United States v. Scheffer.'" The Court made an about-
face, coming to the polar opposite conclusion. This time the issue was
not hypnosis but polygraphs, a technique with a potentially higher
accuracy rate." 4 Again, the Court was faced with a per se rule of
inadmissibility." However, here, the Court stated that because "there
is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable"2 6 and "no
way to know in a particular case whether a polygraph examiner's
conclusion is accurate,"2"' the decision to enforce a per se ban on the
evidence was not arbitrary or disproportionate." 8
The Court in Scheffer distinguished Rock on two grounds. First,
Rock dealt with an impact on the right of the defendant herself to testify,
not a defense witness." 9 Courts which have addressed the issue of the
hypnotically enhanced testimony of defense witnesses have also decided
that Rock only stands for a Compulsory Process Clause analysis of the
hypnotically enhanced testimony of the defendant, not defense wit-
nesses.220 However, as Professor Richard Nagareda points out, this
distinction between the testimony of the defendant and that of defense
212. Slobogin, supra note 35, at 115.
213. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
214. Id. at 310 n.6 (citing a study of a ninety percent accuracy rate). In his
concurrence, Justice Kennedy notes that "there is much inconsistency between the
government's extensive use ofpolygraphs to make vital security determinations and the
argument it makes here, stressing the inaccuracy of these tests." Id. at 318 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
215. Id. at 307.
216. Id at 309.
217. Id. at 312.
218. Id.
219. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 315.
220. See Burral v. State, 724 A.2d 65, 79-81 (Md. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 832
(1999) (holding Rock does not apply to defense witnesses and citing other states which
have adopted per se rules of inadmissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony of
defense witnesses).
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witnesses is arbitrary.22' The Compulsory Process Clause is the right of
a defendant to present "witnesses in his favor, 222 drawing no distinction
or hierarchy. The right to present witnesses is a fundamental
right--"there is no category of 'superfundamental' rights.
2 23
Second, the Scheffer Court claims a difference in that Vickie Rock
was denied an opportunity to present facts, while polygraph testimony
only goes to the issue of credibility.24 That distinction is meaningless
here: Compulsory Process Clause analysis only requires that the
particular item of evidence be "material,'25 and there is no question but
that in a criminal case, evidence going to credibility is "material." For
example, when determining whether the government has fulfilled its
constitutional duty of producing all exculpatory evidence to the defense
in discovery, 26 the Court has declared impeachment evidence going
solely to the issue of credibility as "material" to the defense.22 7 The
outcome in Scheffer seems to be explicable only through a political lens.
In retrospect, the more remarkable case is not Scheffer, which
appears to be the wave of the future, but Rock. Currently, there is no
more unpopular cause than the rights of the mass of criminal defendants.
The real difference between Rock and Scheffer is Vickie Rock. The
decision of the Court turned more on the sympathies of her predicament
as a battered woman fighting for her life than on the law. The concern
was raised-what if the hypnotically enhanced testimony was reliable?
It could have made the difference in the outcome of the case: without it,
the jury would not hear her explain why the gun went off the very
moment she fired. Airman Edward Scheffer was in no such sympathetic
position-he was accused of using drugs and a chemical test indicated
he had drugs in his system. 8 Before the results of the chemical test
were known, he agreed to a polygraph test administered by the Office
of Special Investigations. 29 The fact that he passed a test administered
by the government with potential for a high degree of accuracy was of
221. Richard A. Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right To Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 1063, 1095 (1999) Drawing such a distinction is illogical, as it would tend to
make the right to present witnesses turn on the particular element in dispute, so that if
the defense were misidentification-the defendant contends he was not there-he
would have no right to present his defense in the form of witnesses who were there. Id.
222. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
223. Nagareda, supra note 221, at 1094.
224. 523 U.S. at 317.
225. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967).
226. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
227. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
228. 523 U.S. at 306.
229. Id.
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no moment for the Court. He was a drug user with an unpalatable
"innocent ingestion""23 theory of defense.
Courts and many commentators fear the opening of the floodgates
of social science evidence on behalf of defendants.23' Yet the prosecu-
tion is welcome to place the tentative theory of Rape Trauma Syndrome
before thejury. While the equally tentative theory of Battered Woman's
Syndrome proffered on behalf of defendants has been allowed and
embraced, it has been considered unique as it only applies to a small and
sympathetic class of defendants. The biased application of evidence
laws to favor a politically potent group, such as women, which includes
a large number of wealthy, white, and voting members, disfavor the
bulk of criminal defendants, who lack the political clout to have thejury
hear their evidence. 2
The bottom line is that the rules of evidence cannot be seen as
equalizing rules when viewed through the Sixth Amendment lens. When
faced with proffers of social science evidence on behalf of defendants,
the courts must faithfully apply the teachings of Rock to all defendants,
and admit the evidence, even if it is not Daubert-reliable, as long as it
does not rise to such a level of untrustworthiness that the traditional
tools of advocacy--cross-examination and hiring a prosecution expert
for rebuttal-are ineffective. Under this rubric, Battered Woman
Syndrome, despite its lack of proven reliability, is still admissible on
behalf of the defendant. As articulated by Professor Slobogin, if the goal
of criminal justice system is to promote "a system which not only is fair
but also appears fair, preventing criminal defendants from telling the
best story they can-which might be the impact of a ban on
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 221, at 1067-70 (seeing the problem with
conceiving the Compulsory Process Clause as a defendant's right to exceptions is that
there would be no end in sight to the exceptions). The perceived effect seems
overstated given the fact that studies show that jurors are not overawed by the evidence
and can put it in its proper perspective. See, e.g., Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Social Frameworks: A New Use ofSocial Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REv. 559, 576-77 (1987)
(citing studies showing that mostjurors can utilize social framework evidence properly
and do not give it undue weight).
232. Professor Nagareda points out that the government both makes the evidence
rules and prosecutes: "The concern, in short, is that the government will skew the rules
of evidence in such a way as to favor itself, as prosecutor. Indeed, the concern is all the
stronger given that the interests of criminal defendants have never-certainly not
today--been a cause with great political popularity." Nagareda, supra note 221, at
1125.
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nonscientific psychological testimony-would detract from the system's
legitimacy and its ability to extract compliance with the law." '
On the other hand, the courts must hold the prosecution's evidence
up to Daubert's light and engage in the honest assessments of the
reliability of evidence that they have been avoiding." Rape Trauma
Syndrome does not meet the test, and, in a criminal case where the
prosecution bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, such
unreliable evidence should not be admitted.3 All reasonable doubts
should inure to the benefit of the accused. That much should be sacred.
233. Slobogin, supra note 35, at 117.
234. Professor Faigman agrees that Daubert, if"faithfully applied," would generally
favor criminal defendants and disfavor prosecutors. Faigman, supra note 64, at 292.
235. Other commentators have proposed such differing burdens of admission. See,
e.g., Giannelli, supra note 36, at 1248 (suggesting a higher burden-beyond a
reasonable doubt-for prosecutor than defense); David McCord, Sydromes, Profiles and
Other Mental Exotica, 66 ORE. L. REV. 19, 105-06 (1987) (arguing that constitutional
justifications call for imposing a higher burden of proof on prosecutor regarding
reliability of nontraditional psychological evidence-preponderance of the
evidence-than on the defendant-reasonable possibility); Slobogin, supra note 35, at
113 (contending that under certain circumstances, criminal courts should admit
psychological testimony that does not meet Daubert if the testimony is attempting to
explain a criminal defendant's mental state at the time of the offense); Andrew E.
Taslitz, MyselfAlone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological Character Evidence, 52
MD. L. REv. 1, 117-19 (1993) (proposing a clear and convincing standard for prose-
cutors and a preponderance of the evidence standard for defendants, due to the
increased sense of individual and public respect for justice system that comes from
admitting evidence that enhances prospect of individualized justice).
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